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Abstract 
 
Emphasis on market-friendly macroeconomic and development strategies in recent years has 
resulted in deleterious effects on growth and well-being, and has done little to promote greater 
gender equality. This paper argues that the example of East Asia states, which recognized their 
position as “late industrializers,” relied on a managed-market approach with the state that 
employed a wide variety of policy instruments to promote industrialization. Nevertheless, while 
Asian growth was rapid, it was not enough to produce greater gender equality. A concentration 
of women in mobile export industries that face severe competition from other low-wage 
countries reduces their bargaining power and inhibits closure of gender-wage gaps. Gender-
equitable macroeconomic and development policies are thus required, including financial 
market regulation, regulation of trade and investment flows, and gender-sensitive public sector 
spending. 
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In the last two decades, macroeconomic policies and development strategies have increasingly 
exhibited adherence to the goals of liberalization and global economic integration, deeply 
impacting the lives of women and men across the globe. In most countries, policies reflect a 
commitment to “market fundamentalism,” whereby social policy is sublimated to and 
determined by market outcomes.  
The evidence suggests, however, that this approach has contributed to a slowdown in 
economic growth rates, increased firm mobility, accompanied by an exacerbation of financial 
and economic volatility (Eatwell 1996; Singh 2002; Prasad et al. 2003).  Liberalization policies, 
more generally, seem unable to generate social development in terms of steady increases in 
GDP or in terms of improved standards of health, education, and human security (Wesibrot et 
al. 2001; Çağatay 2004; Wade 2004). Feminist scholars have highlighted the gendered impacts 
of these policies, many of which increase women’s job vulnerability, unpaid work burden, while 
reducing state-level resources that might be used to provide a social safety net (Elson 2002; 
Çağatay and Erturk 2004).    
  What then of those countries that have adopted an interventionist or managed 
market approach? Has this approach led to better macroeconomic performance? And if so, has 
gender equity improved as a result? This paper seeks to answer these questions.  
 
II.  MANAGED MARKET APPROACHES DEVELOPMENT AND GROWTH  
 
The experiences of South Korea and Taiwan exemplify the managed market or heterodox 
approach to growth and development. The core development problem these countries faced was 
that they were “late industrializers,” trying to catch up to the West and Japan.
1 These countries 
recognized that reliance on exports of low cost manufactures and primary commodities would 
not on its own lead to higher incomes or move their economies up the industrial ladder to the 
production of more skill-intensive goods that could ratify higher wages. South Korea and 
                                                 
1 For detailed discussions of South Korea and Taiwan’s development strategies as late industrializers, see Amsden 
(1989, 2001), Wade (1990), Nelson and Pack (1998), and Akyüz et al. (1998).    4
Taiwan therefore proceeded to create dynamic comparative advantage in more technologically 
sophisticated industries.   
To attain these development goals, these East Asian states mediated market transactions. 
The lesson is that the means to promote development and growth differ, depending on the 
historical circumstances and the external environment. Late industrializers faced challenges that 
early industrializers did not and, for that reason, intervention in markets was needed to raise 
domestic capacities so that the “laggards” could compete internationally. This suggests that 
under some circumstances, new institutional forms may need to be created, such as the 
developmental state.  
In the case of East Asia, “catch up” required the government to intervene in markets to 
nurture domestic capabilities. The goal was to help domestic firms compete, based on acquiring 
new technologies from abroad, thereby raising their productivity. Thus, new and strategic 
domestic industries were protected from foreign competition via import tariffs, quotas, and 
outright restrictions. This “breathing space” allowed firms to learn by doing. But such an 
approach also required free trade to meet demand for imported intermediate and capital goods. 
Thus, the state selectively restricted imports. Further, in order to expand capacity in strategic 
industries, which had large capital requirements, governments were required to socialize some 
of the risks of investment.  
   Some economists decry state intervention in markets, pointing to the experience of 
economies that have remained stagnant or backward as a result. In South Korea and Taiwan, 
however, the state’s policies did not block but rather promoted structural changes. First, the state 
targeted investment in strategic industries (industries that would produced spillover effects to 
there industries terms of productivity as well as industries that would reduce reliance on 
imported capital goods). The “carrot” was subsidized interest rates, offered by state-owned 
banks. Firms also benefited from import restrictions on consumer and luxury goods to give 
infant industries the breathing room to learn by doing, contributing to productivity growth but 
also protecting and indeed enhancing firm profits. A critical factor in the success of this 
approach is that the state demanded a quid pro quo for its subsidies to business (Seguino 1999-
2000). Firms had to meet export and investment targets in order to qualify for the largesse the 
government handed out. 
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  Another tool in the “managed market” toolbox was restrictions on foreign direct 
investment (FDI). Taiwan and especially South Korea had little FDI. What little there was, was 
limited to joint ventures and only for limited time in sectors in which the state wanted to 
develop technical capacity. Moreover, most foreign capital was in the form of loans, channeled 
through the government (Amsden 1989, 2001). The limited presence of foreign capital thus 
strengthened the hand of government in managing the economy. Unlike countries such as 
Singapore where foreign firms dominate the domestic economy and can threaten to relocate in 
order to gain concessions from the local government, in South Korea and Taiwan, domestic 
firms whose access to capital was limited were effectively disciplined by the state.  
In sum, these countries engaged in strategic economic openness, a flexible policy 
approach tailored to achieving the domestic goals of promoting industrialization and stable 
economic growth, while pursuing the means to acquire advanced technologies (Singh 1997). As 
a result, Taiwan and Korea have been able to avoid the negative effects of increased competition 
amongst low-wage export producers for a limited market share—a competition that holds down 
wage growth and can lead to employment insecurity. South Korea’s macroeconomic record is 
noteworthy: average annual GDP growth from 1970-95 of 7%, and unemployment at about 2%. 
Taiwan’s growth performance was similarly positive. We can pin this success on their 
willingness to avail themselves of a broader set of policy tools to promote growth, smooth 
economic fluctuations, and gain competitiveness.  
 
III.  GENDER AND EAST ASIAN GROWTH: THE FEMINIZATION OF FOREIGN                      
EXCHANGE EARNINGS 
    
A key component of Taiwan’s and South Korea’s strategy was to target investment in strategic 
sectors to help industries acquire technology needed to upgrade. Low cost exports were relied 
on to generate the foreign exchange necessary to finance technology imports—either in the form 
of turnkey factories, technology licensing, or the purchase of imported capital goods.  
Low-cost exports were produced primarily by women, who faced job segregation in 
export industries (Seguino 1997; Cheng and Hsiung 1998). Empirical evidence suggests that 
low wages for women, roughly half those of men, were a stimulus to growth (Seguino 2000a). 
That is because women’s artificially low wages (due in part to their “crowding” in export 
industries) helped keep the cost of exports low, and thus were a primary factor in generating 
foreign exchange necessary to acquire technology. Further, low wages for women substituted  6
for currency devaluation, thus shielding male wages, and preserving a patriarchal hierarchy in 
both labor markets and households. 
While women’s wages and income grew in absolute terms during this time period as 
female employment in manufacturing expanded, the conditions of women’s employment made 
it difficult to close gender wage gaps. Women’s jobs in labor-intensive export industries 
(wearing apparel, electronics, footwear, plastics, and rubber) were dead end; there was no job 
ladder for women to climb. In numerous cases, women were fired when they married (Nam 
1991). In Taiwan, the state promoted a “living rooms as factories” program to enable women to 
combine unpaid domestic labor with export manufacturing employment (Hsiung 1996). The 
result is that women had little bargaining power in the workplace, and even less at home since 
their outside options (paid work) were tenuous, short-lived and ill-paid. All of this occurred, 
despite more gender equitable educational attainment than in other parts of world.  
 
IV. POLICY AND STRUCTURAL CHANGES IN THE 1990S 
 
A variety of pressures resulted in movement towards more neoliberal policies in the 1990s, even 
in East Asia. This was due in part to the extension of rules favoring transnational corporations, 
especially via the WTO, which reduced the ability of the state to control capital and trade flows 
as a means to implement industrial policies and to raise productivity. The Asian crisis also made 
it possible for IMF to impose neoliberal policies on South Korea, which prior to that time, had 
not needed to resort to IMF lending. With the opening of the crisis and the subsequent IMF 
“bail-out,” South Korea was pushed to adopt the model of an independent central bank. The 
developmental role of the Central Bank and banking system more generally was circumscribed, 
and instead, monetary authorities shifted to a focus on inflation rather than growth and 
employment. The crisis itself, in which thousands of firms faced bankruptcy, created an opening 
for expansion of  foreign ownership in South Korea, increasing the share of FDI in investment 
and thus firm mobility. 
These policy shifts were accompanied by structural changes. Increased competition from 
other low wage producers led to outward FDI, especially of labor-intensive firms, from Taiwan 
to Southeast Asia and China. Given women’s concentration in labor intensive industries, the 
loss of female bargaining power and decline in female employment put downward pressure on  7
female wages relative to men’s, with the result of a widening gender wage gap in manufacturing 
(Seguino 2000b).  
An additional cause of downward pressure on women’s wages subsequent to the Asian 
financial crisis is the shift to more informal work arrangements. Numerous formal sector jobs 
have been converted to informal employment arrangements, structured as subcontracting or 
home worker arrangements. This has occurred primarily in female- dominated labor-intensive 
industries. Women’s sequestration in such jobs provides even less bargaining power and we 
know from research on home workers that the wages women earn in such jobs is little more than 
half of what they earn in formal sector jobs (Roh 1990; Carr et al. 2000; Balakrishnan 2002). 
We don’t know the precise effect of this shift in production strategy on gender wage 
differentials because labor surveys often exclude establishments with less than 5 employees. 
To extrapolate from this experience, it appears that the increased mobility of firms 
combines with women's segregation to lower women’s bargaining power and hold down wages. 
The limited potential for women to raise wages under these conditions combine with the 
precariousness of such employment to circumscribe the benefits of female integration into paid 
labor in a globally integrated economy that places no constraints on firm behavior. 
An additional problem for East Asia has been that the new industrial jobs that are 
emerging are gender-typed, with the result that female share of manufacturing employment is 
declining in Taiwan, and to a lesser extent, in South Korea (Berik 2000) . The reason for 
gender-typing such jobs is not clear. It may be that more technologically sophisticated jobs are 
less reliant on low labor costs of remarket share as capital intensity of production rises, and 
therefore it becomes less costly to exclude women from such jobs. It may also be linked to 
training. Women’s gender role as caretaker prejudices employers from hiring them, since it is 
assumed women’s job tenures will be shorter than men’s due to the expectation they will 
withdraw from the labor force when they marry. 
    In sum, 40 years after the take-off of the Asian Tigers, the gender wage ratio in Korea is 
55.6% in 1999 (ILO 2003). In Taiwan, women’s wages are roughly 2/3 of men’s, and the gap 
due to discrimination has increased since 1980 (Berik et al. 2004).  There is evidence for both 
Taiwan and South Korea that the gender wage ratio is inversely related to trade. Moreover, the 
evidence suggests that the increased mobility of capital, due to relaxation of rules on FDI, has 
contributed to a widening gender wage gap in Taiwan (Seguino 2000b).  
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The reasons for this unhappy outcome can be summarized as follows. Women are concentrated 
in industries in which workers have less bargaining power—industries in which foreign firms 
are more “mobile” as well as domestic firms that produce for export.  The experience of these 
countries shows that FDI and trade liberalization reinforce the tendency to job segregation and 
thus women’s lower wages.  
Women’s share of manufacturing employment is rising in other SE Asian economies 
(Thailand and Malaysia, and China) but if the experience of South Korea and Taiwan is any 
example, these employment gains are likely to be transitory. Moreover, the low bargaining 
power of women in these mobile industries is likely to hold wages down. Indeed, there is 
evidence that the portion of the gender gap not explained by skill differences has widened in 
China (Maurer-Fazio and Hughes 2002). Further, in Viet Nam we observe that liberalization 
coincides with an increase in the discriminatory component of wage payments (Packard 2004).  
  FDI has been shown to have a negative effect on wages in other countries as well.
 2 
Evidence from semi-industrialized economies indicates that FDI is inversely related to wage 
growth (Seguino 2005a). It is likely that FDI more negatively affects women than men, at least 
in semi-industrialized countries, because they are concentrated in mobile industries. The reverse 
is true in industrialized countries, and in particular the US, where firm mobility has been linked 
to a decline in male wages and a narrowing of the gender wage gap (Kongar 2004). 
Other more direct indicators of well-being such as female to male population ratios show 
that that ratio is declining in China, Korea, and India (Klasen and Wink 2003). This is due to 
excess female infant mortality and child mortality, sex bias in access to health, and increasingly, 
sex selective abortion. These outcomes suggest that growth is not sufficient to improve 
women’s status, and indeed, in spite of rapid growth, women’s relative economic status can 
worsen.  
 
IV.  STRATEGIES FOR IMPROVING WELL-BEING 
 
As the previous section suggests, faster growth is not enough to close gender gaps in well-being. 
The World Bank (2001), in its analysis of the effects of growth on women’s relative education, 
arrives at the opposite conclusions, arguing that growth is good for women. Their focus is on 
                                                 
2 Several other studies have found similar effects in industrialized countries, and a broader range of developing 
economies. See Barry et al. 2001; Choi 2001; Gopinath and Chen. 2003; Oostendorp 2004.  
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education and life expectancy, but they fail to consider the economic aspects of women’s well-
being, including employment, unemployment, wages, and access to social safety nets. 
There is some evidence, particularly among the lowest income and middle-income semi-
industrialized countries, that growth is inversely related to a composite measure of well-being 
that includes variables measuring capabilities as well as some economic variables (Seguino 
2002, 2003a, 2004). This is not an argument in favor of slow growth since clearly a goal is 
raising not only relative well-being but also absolute well-being—and the latter require an 
expansion of output. But these findings do underscore that key distributive mechanisms—in 
particular, via labor markets and the state—need to operate in such a way as to ensure that 
increases in output will remedy existing gender inequalities.  
What other macro level policies can promote gender equity in well-being? First, we 
should be clear about what our goals are. The movement toward gender equity in well-being 
requires strategies that enhance women’s capabilities as well as their ability to provision for 
themselves and their families. The goal of adequate livelihood or means to provision requires 
ability to generate adequate levels of income as well as security of income.   
What policies then can be enacted to improve women’s well-being and promote gender 
equity? Focusing attention here on gender gaps in capabilities and opportunities to provision for 
oneself and one’s family, policies to promote gender equity in four areas are critical:  
•  expansionary macroeconomic policy; 
•  financial market regulation; 
•  regulation of trade and investment flows; 
•  gender-sensitive public sector spending. 
•   
I discuss each of these briefly in turn. In so doing, it should be emphasized that we must 
avoid a one-size-fits-all approach, since economic structure will determine the parameters of 
policy designed to close gender gaps.
3 
 
                                                 
3 For a more detailed discussion of these issues, see Elson and Ça atay  (2000), Seguino and Grown (2003) and 
Ça atay and Erturk (2004).  10
Expansionary Macroeconomic Policy 
Tight monetary and fiscal policies associated with neoliberal macroeconomic policies have been 
harmful. They have led to a deflationary bias—slow growth and high unemployment—that 
harms women more than men (Braunstein and Heintz 2005; Charmes et al. 2002; Fodor  2004; 
Seguino  2003b). Fiscal austerity, pushed by the IMF but also the result of financial 
liberalization in which financial markets perceive budget deficits as inflationary and therefore 
harmful to returns on investment, has led to downward pressure on public budgets with cuts in 
public expenditures redounding more heavily on women and girls. 
The emphasis on low inflation, pushed by the IMF, is too great. The theoretical 
framework which lauds low inflation rates fails to take into account the costs of unemployment, 
including the long-run growth effects. Moreover, the most rapidly growing economies have 
hardly been stymied by moderate inflation. For example, South Korea’s GDP growth from 
1970-95, which averaged 7% a year, was accompanied by an average annual inflation rate of 
13%.
4 This is consistent with the findings of a World Bank study by Bruno and Easterly (1998) 
that found no evidence of a negative effect of inflation on growth until it reaches 40% a year.  
To refocus away from an excessive emphasis on inflation targeting, it is useful to restore 
the central bank’s role in macroeconomic management, shifting it from one of inflation 
targeting to the achievement of a number of gender-equitable goals, including employment 
generation and targeted investment to strategic sectors to stimulate productivity growth. A shift 
in central bank targets to encompass livelihood-enhancing goals would enable governments to 
pursue expansionary fiscal policy as well, without such policies being vetoed by central banks 
(Epstein 2003).  
 
Role Of The State 
Of course, inflationary pressures can arise, and these often result from supply bottlenecks. 
Therefore, government must be an active participant in the growth and development process, 
able to shift resources to areas where supply bottlenecks exist, such as in infrastructure, 
education, and training. Also, industrial policy is needed to move countries out of emphasis on 
low-wage labor-intensive commodities. Such measures would include selective import 
protection, the promotion of export goods whose demand will rise as world income rises, and 
selective subsidized credit allocation.  
                                                 
4 Author’s calculations from World Development Indicators data.  11
 
Active labor market policies are also needed. These enable those whose jobs have been 
eliminated to retrain for newly emerging jobs. Women will benefit from such policies, 
particularly if they include funding for childcare.  
 
Regulation Of Firm Mobility And Capital Flows 
Because of the increased mobility, it is unlikely that firms can be induced to take up  
such training costs unless they are given tax incentive to do so. This highlights the potential 
benefits of circumscribing firm mobility, although there are other reasons to do so as well. 
Limiting firm mobility also creates the conditions whereby higher wages that induce increased 
productivity can be ratified. Under current conditions, firms can easily relocate in response to 
wage demands, and the possibility of a win-win situation in which higher wages induce 
productivity growth, keeping labor costs relatively constant, is prohibited. 
Regulation of capital flows can avoid excessive volatility of such flows and exchange 
rates, which have a destabilizing effect on economies that women bear the brunt of. Regulation 
of flows will reduce pressures to limit government spending, as noted above.  
 
Labor Standards 
Labor standards are also a mechanism for raising the wages and employment conditions of 
workers in export industries. This policy tool, implemented at the international level, is designed 
to place a floor beneath workers to ensure or to provide workers the bargaining power to 
demand a decent living standard.
5 
 
Gender Sensitive Public Spending 
The national government represents a critical locus of resources with which to promote gender 
equity. Regulation of capital flows will permit greater flexibility in public expenditures levels. 
That is a step in the direction of expanding women’s capabilities via government expenditures 
that overcome household biases. Furthermore, public expenditures in infrastructure, such as 
clean water and roads, can reduce women’s unpaid care burden, along with public expenditures 
                                                 
5 There is as yet no consensus on this position amongst feminist economists. For more discussion of these issues, 
see Seguino (2005b) and Kabeer (2004).  12
on health care. An important question is which mechanisms will contribute to a gender-
equitable use of those resources.  
Gender responsive budget audits are useful mechanism to achieve this goal (Hewitt and 
Mukhopadhyay 2001). Budget audits can be used to review and analyze national budgets and 
expenditures to determine which groups benefit from fiscal policies, and whether biases against 
women, poor people or other disadvantaged groups are built into them. 
In sum, trade and FDI policies must be employed as a means to promote development 
and expanded well-being. Managing trade and competitiveness are necessary to protect the 
domestic economy from severe employment dislocation, and entrenched dependence on exports 
of labor- intensive goods and primary commodities whose demand is unlikely to rise in the 
future, thus putting downward pressure on prices and thus wages. This implies that trade policy 
must be a tool of a country’s development strategy rather than an end in itself. As such, this 
means that  while liberalization may be the right strategy at some times and for some goods, 
there are also circumstances for which trade protection is warranted to give domestic firms the 
breathing space to develop capacity to compete in international markets. While temporary trade 
protections may be justified, such policies work only if there is a quid pro quo—if domestic 
firms are held accountable to measurable targets in return for protection. Managing FDI helps to 
rebalance the bargaining power of workers, and also may promote productivity growth as firms 




The well-being of women in developing countries relies in part on reforming the austerity 
policies that have influenced macroeconomic policies in developed countries. These policies 
have also had negative effects on women in developed economies in access to employment, 
wage, and shortages of funding for public goods. There is thus common cause amongst women 
in the global north and south in a number of areas, including capital controls, alternative roles 
for central banks, limited firm mobility, and labor standards.   13
REFERENCES 
 
Amsden, A. 1989. Asia's Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization.  New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
 
_____.  2001. The Rise of the “Rest”: Challenges to the West from Late-Industrializing 
Economies. Oxford University Press. 
 
Akyüz, Y, H-J. Chang, and R. Kozul-Wright. 1998. “New Perspectives on East Asian 
Development.” Journal of Development Studies 34 (6): 4-36. 
  
Balakrishnan, R. (ed). 2002. The Hidden Assembly Line: Gender Dynamics of Subcontracted 
Work in a Global Economy. Bloomfield CT: Kumarian Press. 
 
Barry, F., H. Gőrg, and E. Strobl. 2001. “Foreign Direct Investment and Wages in Domestic 
Firms” Productivity Spillovers vs. Labor Market Crowding Out.” Mimeo. University 
College of Dublin and University of Nottingham. 
 
Berik, G.  2000. “Mature Export-Led Growth and Gender Wage Inequality in Taiwan.” Feminist 
Economics 6 (3): 1-26. 
 
Berik G, Rodgers Y, Zveglich J. 2004. “International Trade and Gender Wage Discrimination: 
Evidence from East Asia.” Review of Development Economics 8(2): 237-254. 
 
Braunstein, E. and J. Heintz, 2005. “Gender and Central Banking: Issues to Consider.” 
Unpublished manuscript, Political Economy Reesarch Institute. 
 
Bruno, M. and W. Easterly. 1998. "Inflation Crises and Long-Run Growth." Journal of 
Monetary Economics 41(1): 3-26. 
 
Çağatay, N. 2004. "Economic Growth, Gender Inequalities and Poverty Reduction." Paper 
presented at the conference on Reducción de la Pobreza, Gobernabilidad Democrática y 
Equidad de Género, held in Managua, October; forthcoming (in Spanish) Mara Martinez 
(ed.)  Reducción de la Pobreza, Gobernabilidad Democrática y Equidad de Género, 
Managua.  
 
Çağatay, N. and K. Erturk. 2004. “Gender and Globalization: A Macroeconomic Perspective.” 
Technical background paper for the Final Report of the World Commission on the Social 
Dimension of Globalization, A Fair Globalization: Creating Opportunities For All, ILO, 
Geneva.  
 
Carr M, Chen M, and J. Tate. 2000. “Globalization and Home-based Workers.” Feminist 
Economics 6 (3): 123-42. 
  14
Charmes, J., J.Vanek, M. Chen, M. Guerrero, F. Carré, R. Negrete, J. Unni, D. Budlender. 2002. 
“Women and Men in the Informal Economy: A Statistical Picture.” Geneva: 
International Labour Office.  
 
Cheng, L. and P.-C. Hsiung. 1998. “Engendering the Economic Miracle: The Labour Market in 
the Asia-Pacific.” In G. Thompson (ed.) Economic Dynamism in the Asia-Pacific. 
London: Routledge. 112-36. 
 
Choi, M. 2001. “Threat Effect of Foreign Direct Investment on Labor Union Wage Premium.” 
Working Paper Series No. 27. Political Economy Research Institute, University of 
Massachusetts at Amherst. 
 
Eatwell, John. 1996. “International Financial Liberalization: The Iimpact on World 
Development.” Discussion Papers No. 12. Office of Development Studies. New York, 
UNDP. 
 
Elson, D. 2002. “Gender Justice, Human Rights, and Neo-liberal Economic Policy.” In M. 
Molyneux and S. Razavi (eds.) Gender Justice, Development, and Human Rights. 
Oxford University Press: 78-114.  
 
Elson, D. and N. Çağatay. 2000. “The Social Content of Macroeconomic Policies.” World  
Development (Special Issue on Growth, Trade, Finance, and Gender Inequality) 28(7): 1347-64. 
 
Epsetien, G. 2003. “Alternatives to Inflation Targeting Monetary Policy for Stable and 
Egalitarian Growth: A Brief Research Summary.” PERI Working Paper Series, No. 62, 
University of Massachusetts at Amherst. 
 
Fodor, E. 2004. “Women at Work: The Status of Women in the Labour Markets of the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, and Poland. “ Background paper for UNRISD Report on Gender 
Equality: Striving for Justice in an Unequal World. 
 
Gopinath, M. and W. Chen. 2003. “Foreign Direct Investment and Wages: a Cross  Country 
Analysis.” Journal of International Trade and Development 12(3): 285-309. 
 
Heintz, J. 2002. “Global Labor Standards: Their Impact and Implementation.” PERI Working 
Paper Series No. 46. University of Massachusetts at Amherst.  
 
Hewitt, G. and T. Mukhopadhyay. 2001. “Promoting Gender Equality through Public  
Expenditure.” In D. Budlender, D. Elson, G. Hewitt, Guy, and T. Mukhopadhyay (eds.) Gender 
Budgets Make Cents. London: Commonwealth Secretariat. 
 
Hsiung, P.-C. 1996. Living Rooms as Factories: Class, Gender, and the Satellite Factor System 
in Taiwan. Philadelphia PA: Temple University Press. 
 
International Labour Organization (ILO). 2003. Yearbook of Labour Statistics. Geneva: Author. 
Kabeer, N. 2004. “Globalization, Labor Standards, and Women's Rights: Dilemmas of 
Collective (In)action in an Interdependent World.” Feminist Economics 10(1): 3-35.  
  15
Klasen, S. and C. Wink. 2003. “’Missing Women’: Revisiting the Debate.” Feminist Economics 
9(2): 263-99. 
 
Kongar, E. 2004."Importing Equality or Exporting Jobs? Competition and Gender Wage and 
Employment Differentials" Unpublished manuscript. Dickinson College.  
 
Maurer-Fazio, M. and J. Hughes. 2002. “The Effects of Market Liberalization on the Relative 
Earnings of Chinese Women.” William Davidson Working Paper Number 460. 
 
Nam, J.-L., 1991, Income Inequality Between the Sexes and the Role of the State: South Korea 
1960-90. Ph.D. dissertation. Bloomington IN: Indiana University. 
 
Nelson, R. and H. Pack 1998 “The Asian Miracle and Modern Growth Theory.” Policy 
Research Working Paper 1881. Washington DC: World Bank. 
 
Oostendorp, R. 2004. “Globalization and the Gender Wage Gap.” World Bank Policy Research 
Working Paper 3256 
 
Packard, Le Anh Tu. 2004. “Gender Dimensions of Vietnam’s Comprehensive Macroeconomic 
and Structural Reform Policies.” Background paper for UNRISD Report on Gender 
Equality: Striving for Justice in an Unequal World. 
 
Prasad, E., K. Rogoff, S.-J. Wei, and  M. A. Kose. 2003. “Effects of Financial Globalization on 
Developing Countries Some Empirical Evidence.” Occasional Paper. Washington DC: 
International Monetary Fund. 
 
Roh, M. 1990. “A Study on Home-Based Work in South Korea.” Women’s Studies Forum 
(Korean Women’s Development Institute): 45-145. 
 
Seguino, S. 1997. “Gender Wage Inequality and Export-Led Growth in South Korea."  Journal 
of Development Studies 34 (2): 102-32. 
 
_____. 1999-2000. “The Investment Function Revisited: Disciplining Capital in Korea." 
Journal of Post-Keynesian Economics 22 (2): 313-38. 
 
_____. 2000a. “Accounting for Gender in Asian Economic Growth.” Feminist Economics 6 (3): 
22-58. 
 
_____. 2000b. “The Effects of Structural Change and Economic Liberalization on Gender Wage 
Differentials in South Korea and Taiwan.” Cambridge Journal of Economics 24 (4): 
437-59. 
 
_____. 2002. “Gender, Quality of Life, and Growth in Asia 1970 to 1990.”  The Pacific Review 
15 (2): 245-77. 
 
_____. 2003a. “Is Economic Growth Good for Well-being?: Evidence of Gender Effects in 
Latin America  and the Caribbean.” Background paper for Center for Global 
Development.   16
 
_____. 2003b. “Why are Women in the Caribbean So Much More Likely Than Men to be 
Unemployed?” Social and Economic Studies 52(4): 83-120.   
 
_____ 2004. “Gender, Well-Being, and Equality: Assessing Status, Trends, and the Way 
Forward.” February 2004. Background paper for UNRISD Report on Gender Equality: 
Striving for Justice in an Unequal World. 
 
_____. 2005a. “Is More Mobility Good?: Mobile Capital and the Low Wage Low Productivity 
Trap.” Working Paper No. 423. Annandale-on-Hudson NY: The Levy Economics 
Institute. 
 
_____. 2005b. (Forthcoming)  “Promoting Gender Equality through Labor Standards and Living 
Wages: An Exploration of the Issues.” In E. Kupier and D. Barker, Feminist 
Perspectives on Gender and the World Bank. Routledge. 
 
Seguino, S. and C. Grown. 2003. “Feminist-Kaleckian Macroeconomic Policy for Developing 
Countries.” Working paper. 
 
Singh, A. 1997. “Catching up with the Rest: A Perspective on Asian Economic Development 
and Lessons for Latin America.” In. L. Emmerji. (ed). Economic and Social 
Development in the XXI Century. Washington DC: Johns Hopkins Press, 222-72. 
 
_____. 2002. “Capital Account Liberalization, Free Long-Term Capital Flows, Financial Crises, 
and Economic Development.” Working Paper No. 245 ESRC. Cambridge UK: Centre 
for Business Research, University of Cambridge.  
 
UNRISD. 2005. Gender Equality: Striving for Justice in an Unequal World. Geneva: Author. 
 
Wade, R. 1990. Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East 
Asian Industrialization. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press. 
 
_____. 2004 "Is Globalization Reducing Poverty and Inequality?” World Development 32(4): 
567-589. 
 
Wade, R. and F. Veneroso. 1998. “The Asian Financial Crisis: The High Debt Model versus the 
Wall Street-Treasury-IMF Complex.”  New Left Review. 228: 3-23.  
 
Weisbrot, M., D. Baker, E. Kraev and J. Chen. 2001. “The Scorecard on Globalization 1980-
2000: Twenty Years of Diminished Progress.” Washington DC: Center For Economic 
Policy Research.  
 
World Bank.  2001. Engendering Development. Oxford University Press.   